This Justice Department report was issued in 1970 after months of intensive investigation by over 100 FBI agents. Every available witness was interviewed by the FBI including guardsmen, students, KSU faculty & other eyewitnesses & participants in the events of May 1-4, 1970.

Attention students: Here are exact quotes from the 35-page summary, after months of intensive investigation by hundreds of FBI agents re: Kent State-- ON MAY 4, 1970,at Kent State University. These are the conclusions the FBI got correctly.

Here are verbatim quotes as indicated within quotation marks below:

"... Most persons estimate that about 200-300 students were gathered around the Victory Bell on the commons with another 1,000 or so students gathered on the hill directly behind them."

"...the crowd apparently was initially peaceful and relatively quiet."

"...96 men of Companies A and C, 145th Infantry and of Troop G, 107th Armored Cavalry were ordered to advance. Bayonets were fixed and their weapons were "locked and loaded", with one round in the chamber...all wore gas masks. Some carried .45 pistols, most carried M-1 rifles, and a few carried shotguns loaded with 7 1/2 birdshot and double-ought buckshot."

"...the combination of the advancing troops and the teargas forced the students to retreat."

"...fifty-three members of Company A, 18 members of Troop G and two members of Company C, all commanded by General Canterbury and Lt. Col. Fassinger moved...pursuing the main body of students who retreated..."

"...one group of students retreated to a paved parking lot south of Prentice Hall..."

"...the Guard then moved...onto the field where it took up a position..."

"...some of the students...then returned to within range of the Guard and began to pelt them with objects..."

"...four Guardsmen claim they were hit with rocks at this time..."

"...some rocks were thrown back at the students by the Guard."

"...just prior to the time the Guard left its position on the practice field, members of Troop G were ordered to kneel and aim their weapons at the students in the parking lot south of Prentice Hall. They did so, but did not fire."

"...the Guard was then ordered to regroup and move back up the hill past Taylor Hall."

"...when the Guard reached the crest of Blanket Hill by the southeast corner of Taylor Hall at about 12:25pm, they faced the students following them and fired their weapons. Four students were killed and nine were wounded."

"...the few moments immediately prior to the shootings are shrouded in confusion and highly conflicting statements. Many Guardsmen claim that they felt their lives were in danger from the students for a variety of reasons...because they were 'surrounded'...because a sniper fired at them...stones...the students 'advanced upon them in a threatening manner'..."

"...we [the FBI] have some reason to believe that the claim by the National Guard that their lives were endangered by the students was fabricated subsequent to the event..." [!]

"...[a Guardsman] admitted that his life was not in danger and that he fired indiscriminately into the crowd. He further stated that the Guardsmen had gotten together after the shooting and decided to fabricate the story that they were in danger of serious bodily harm or death from the students... [NOTE: that same triggerman Guardsman added]: "...the guys have been saying that we got to get together and stick to the same story, that it was our lives or them, a matter of survival. I told them I would tell the truth and couldn't get in trouble that way."

"...also, a chaplain of Troop G spoke with many members of the National Guard and stated that they were unable to explain to him why they fired their weapons."

"...available photographs indicate that the nearest student was 60 feet away" [at time of shootings]. "...no verbal warning was given to the students immediately prior to the time the Guardsmen fired."

"...one Guardsman, Sgt. McManus, stated that after the firing began, he gave an order to 'fire over their heads'".

"...the Guardsmen were not surrounded...they could easily have continued going in the direction in which they had been going."

2.  President's Commission on Campus Unrest:   1970 report to President Nixon re: Kent State tragedy

Kent State was a national tragedy. It was not, however, a unique tragedy. Only the magnitude of the student disorder and the extent of student death and injuries set it apart from similar occurrences on numerous other American campuses during the past few years. We must learn from the particular horror of Kent State and insure that it is never repeated...

The widespread student opposition to the Cambodian action and their general resentment of the National Guardsmen's presence on the campus cannot justify the violent and irresponsible actions of many students during the long weekend.

The Cambodian invasion defined a watershed in the attitude of Kent Students toward American policy in the Indochina war.

Kent State had experienced no major turmoil during the preceding year, and no disturbances comparable in scope to the events of May had ever occurred on the campus. Some students thought the Cambodian action was an unacceptable contradiction of the announced policy of gradual withdrawal from Vietnam, or that the action constituted invasion of a neutral country, or that it would prolong rather than shorten the war. Opposition to the war appears to have been the principal issue around which students rallied during the first two days of May.

Thereafter, the presence of the National Guard on campus was the focus of discontent. The Guard's presence appears to have been the main attraction and the main issue for most students who came to the May 4 rally. For students deeply opposed to the war, the Guard was a living symbol of the military system they opposed. For other students, the Guard was an outsider on their campus, prohibiting all their rallies, even peaceful ones, ordering them about, and tear gassing them when they refused to obey.

The May 4 rally began as a peaceful assembly on the Commons-the traditional site of student assemblies. Even if the Guard had authority to prohibit a peaceful gathering-a question that is at least debatable-the decision to disperse the noon rally was a serious error. The timing and manner of the dispersal were disastrous. Many students were legitimately in the area as they went to and from class. The rally was held during the crowded noontime luncheon period. The rally was peaceful, and there was no apparent impending violence. Only when the Guard attempted to disperse the rally did some students react violently.

Under these circumstances, the Guard's decision to march through the crowd for hundreds of yards up and down a hill was highly questionable. The crowd simply swirled around them and reformed again after they had passed. The Guard found itself on a football practice field far removed from its supply base and running out of tear gas. Guardsmen had been subjected to harassment and assault, were hot and tired, and felt dangerously vulnerable by the time they returned to the top of Blanket Hill...

Many students considered the Guard's march from the ROTC ruins across the Commons up Blanket Hill, down to the football practice field, and back to Blanket Hill as a kind of charade. Tear gas canisters were tossed back and forth to the cheers of the crowd, many of whom acted as if they were watching a game.

Lt. Alexander D. Stevenson, a platoon leader of Troop G, described the crowd in these words:

"At the time of the firing, the crowd was acting like this whole thing was a circus. The crowd must have thought that the National Guard must have thought that the National Guard was harmless. They were having fun with the Guard. The circus was in town."

...The indiscriminate firing of rifles into a crowd of students and the deaths that followed were unnecessary, unwarranted, and inexcusable.

The National Guardsmen on the Kent State campus were armed with loaded M-1 rifles, high-velocity weapons with a horizontal range of almost two miles. As they confronted the students, all that stood between a guardsman and firing was the flick of a thumb on the safety mechanism, and the pull of an index finger on the trigger. When firing began, the toll taken by these lethal weapons was disastrous.

The Guard fired amidst great turmoil and confusion, engendered in part by their own activities. But the guardsmen should no have been able to kill so easily in the first place. The general issuance of loaded weapons to law enforcement officers engaged in controlling disorders is never justified except in the case of armed resistance that trained sniper teams are unable to handle. This was not the case at Kent State, yet each guardsman carried a loaded M-1rifle.

This lesson is not new. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders and the guidelines of the Department of the Army set it out explicitly.

No one would have died if this lesson had been learned by the Ohio National Guard.

Even if the guardsmen faced danger, it was not a danger that called for lethal force. The 61 shots by 28 guardsmen certainly cannot be justified. Apparently, no order to fire was given, and there was inadequate fire control discipline on Blanket Hill. The Kent State tragedy must mark the last time that, as a matter of course, loaded rifles are issued to guardsmen confronting student demonstrators.

Our entire report attempts to define the lessons of Kent State, lessons that the Guard, police, students, faculty, administrators, government at all levels, and the American people must learn-and begin, at once, to act upon. We commend it to their attention.

3.   1970 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT of the Ohio National Guard.

The Ohio National Guard in 1970 was supposed to annually train each guardsman during a minimum of 16 hours of "crowd control training". Most of the killers at Kent State had zero or very few hours of actual training in crowd control. These triggermen were poorly trained, poorly led and they were over-equipped with deadly weapons. These killer guardsmen in the "death squad", Troop G, were armed with deadly M-1 carbine rifles which were "locked and loaded" with eight bullets in a clip. Several later testified under oath in Cleveland Federal Court that they hear an order to fire their weapons at 12:24pm at Kent State University. They violated their own "rules of engagement" and clearly used excessive force against unarmed students. According to the FBI investigation, "...there was no sniper". Here's excerpts:

Annex F (Pre-Employment Briefing)
to Oplan (Aid to Civil Authorities)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. In any action that you are required to take, use only the minimum force necessary. When the Riot Act has been read within hearing, it is unlawful for any group of three or more people to remain unlawfully or riotously assembled and you may use necessary and proper means to disperse or apprehend them. Keeping groups from assembling prevents crowds which may become unruly and take mob action. Your use of force should be in the sequence listed below:

a. Issue a military request to disperse.

1. Insure that an avenue of dispersal is available.
2. Allow ample time for them to obey the order.
3. Remain in area for sufficient time to prevent re-assembly.

b. Riot information - show of force. Instructions in a. (1) (2) (3) above apply.

c. Simple physical force, if feasible.

d. Rifle butt and bayonet: If people do not respond to request, direction and order, and if simple physical force is not feasible, you have the rifle butt and bayonet which may be used in that order, using only such force as is necessary.

e. Chemical. If people fail to respond to requests or orders, and riot information and rifle butts or bayonets prove ineffective, chemicals (baseball grenades or jumping grenades) will be used on order when available. When large demands for chemicals are required, a chemical squad will be dispatched to assist you upon request.

f. Weapons. When all other means have failed or chemicals are not readily available, you are armed with the rifle and have been issued live ammunition. The following rules apply in the use of firearms:

1. Rifles will be carried with a round in the chamber in the safe position. Exercise care and be safety-minded at all times.
2. Indiscriminate firing of weapons is forbidden. Only single aimed shots at confirmed targets will be employed. Potential targets are:
   • (a) Sniper--(Determined by his firing upon, or in the direction of friendly forces or civilians) will be fired upon when clearly observed and it is determined than an attempt to apprehend would be hazardous or other means of neutralization are impractical...
   • (c) Other. In any instance where human life is endangered by the forcible, violent actions of a rioter, or when rioters to whom the Riot Act has been read cannot be dispersed by any other reasonable means, then shooting is justified.

SUMMARY...

b. If there is absolute or apparently necessity and all other means of preventing the crimes of murder (such as sniper fire), robbery, burglary, rape, or arson (fire bombing of inhabited building or structure) have been exhausted, then life may be taken to prevent these forcible and atrocious crimes...

c. When the Riot Act has been read within hearing and you are engaged in dispersing or apprehending rioters, using necessary and proper means, then you are declared by Ohio State (RC 3761.15) to be guiltless if any of the persons unlawfully or violently assembled is killed, maimed, or otherwise injured in consequence of resisting.

With specific reference to the discharge of weapons, another Ohio Guard training manual states:

• I will fire when required to save my life or when returning fire.

• A sniper being an individual who fires a small caliber weapon from a concealed location represents a dangerous adversary to civilians and Guardsmen alike.

• The following is a recommended method of eliminating or capturing a sniper: On coming under fire, the patrol take cover immediately. No fire is returned the sniper's location is definitely pinpointed, in which case, single aimed shots are fired necessary.